크레마클럽

CONTENTS LECTURE I THE PROBLEM OF LOGIC 1. Difficulty of the Science 1 2. The Problem stated 3 3. World as Idea 4 4. “ World” 5 5. The Animal’s World 6 6. The World as “ Objective” 7 i. Common sense 8 ii. Common- sense Theory 8 iii. Philosophic Theory 11 7. Our separate “ Worlds” 14 8. Subjective Idealism 19 LECTURE II JUDGMENT AS THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF A WORLD 1. Defect of Subjective Idealism 21 2. The World as Knowledge 22 3. Knowledge is in the form of Judgment 23 a. Necessary 23 b. Universal 26 c. Constructive 27 4. The Continuous Affirmation of Waking Consciousness 33 5. Comparison with World as Will 37 6. Distribution of Attention 40 LECTURE III THE RELATION OF LOGIC TO KNOWLEDGE 1. Meaning of “ Form” 42 2. Form of Knowledge dependent on Content 49 3. The Relation of Part and Whole as Form determined by Content 54 4. Nature of Knowledge 58 5. Conclusion 59 LECTURE IV TYPES OF JUDGMENT, AND THE GENERAL CONDITIONS INVOLVED IN ASSERTION 1. Correspondence between Types of Judgment and Nature of Objects as Knowledge 61 a. Impersonal Judgment 61 b. Perceptive Judgment 62 c. Proper Names in Judgment 64 d. Abstract Judgment 65 2. The General Definition of Judgment 66 i. What is implied in claiming Truth 67 ii. By what means the claim is made 69 iii. The kind of Ideas which can claim Truth 74 a. Idea as Psychical Presentation 74 b. Idea as Identical Reference 74 LECTURE V THE PROPOSITION AND THE NAME 1. Judgment translated into Language 80 2. Proposition and Sentence 82 3. Difference between Proposition and Judgment 82 4. “ Parts of Speech” 85 5. Denotation and Connotation 88 6. Have Proper Names Connotation? 91 7. Inverse Ratio of Connotation and Denotation 94 { ix} LECTURE VI PARTS OF THE JUDGMENT, AND ITS UNITY 1. Parts of the Judgment 98 2. Copula 99 3. Are Subject and Predicate necessary? 100 4. Two Ideas or Things 101 a. Two Ideas 102 i. Mental Transition 102 ii. Absence of Assertion 103 b. Two Things 104 5. Distinction between Subject and Predicate 107 LECTURE VII THE CATEGORICAL AND THE HYPOTHETICAL JUDGMENTS 1. Some Criticisms on the ordinary scheme of Judgment 112 a. Why we need a Scheme 112 b. The Common Scheme 113 2. Which Judgments are Categorical? 116 (1) The “ Particular” Judgment 116 a. Natural Meaning 116 b. Limited Meaning 117 (2) “ Singular” Judgment 118 (3) “ Universal” Judgment 119 (4) “ Hypothetical” Judgment 121 (5) “ Disjunctive” Judgment 123 LECTURE VIII NEGATION, AND OPPOSITION OF JUDGMENTS 1. Distinction between Contrary and Contradictory Opposition 126 2. Contrary Negation 128 3. Why use Negation? 130 4. Stage of Significant Negation; Combination of Contrary and Contradictory 132 5. Negative Judgment expressing Fact 134 6. Operation of the Denied Idea 135 { x} LECTURE IX INFERENCE AND THE SYLLOGISTIC FORMS 1. Inference in General 137 2. Conditions of the Possibility of Inference 139 3. System the ultimate condition of Inference 140 4. Immediate Inference 141 5. Number of Instances 142 6. Figures of Syllogism, illustrating Progress from Guess- work to Demonstration 146 LECTURE X INDUCTION, DEDUCTION, AND CAUSATION 1. Induction 151 a. By simple Enumeration 151 b. Enumeration always has a Ground 152 c. Perfect Induction 152 d. System 153 e. Analogy as Step towards System 155 f. Negative Instance 158 g. Classification and Generalisation 159 h. Hypothesis 161 2. Deduction 162 a. Subsumption 163 b. Construction 163 3. Causation 164 4. The Postulate of Knowledge 165 5. Conclusion 166

펼쳐보기접어보기

출판사 리뷰

논리의 요점을 판단과 추론의 론論상의 10개 강의.The Book of The Essentials of Logic,being TEN LECTURES ON JUDGMENT AND INFERENCE , by Bernard Bosanquet PREFACE In this course of lectures I have attempted to carry out, under the freer conditions of the University Extension system, a purpose conceived many years ago at Oxford. It was suggested to me by the answer of a friend, engaged like myself from time to time in teaching elementary Logic, to the question which I put to him, “ What do you aim at in teaching Logic to beginners? What do you think can reasonably be hoped for?” “ If the men could learn what an Inference is, it would be something,” was the reply. The course of lectures which I now publish was projected in the spirit thus indicated. Though only the two last discourses deal explicitly with Inference, yet those which precede them contribute, I hope, no less essentially, to explain the nature of that single development which in some stages we call Judgment, and in others Inference. So far as I could see, the attempt to go to the heart of the subject, however imperfectly executed, was appreciated by the students, and was rewarded with a serious attention which would not have been commanded by the trivialities of formal Logic, although more entertaining and less abstruse. The details of traditional terminology may be found in Jevons’s Elementary Lessons in Logic (Macmillan). Those { vi} who desire to pursue the study more in the sense of the present work, may be referred above all to Bradley’s Principles of Logic, and also to Lotze’s Logic (E. Tr.), and to Sigwart’s great work on Logic, the English translation of which, just completed, opens a storehouse of knowledge and robust good sense to the English student. My own larger Logic expresses in extenso the views which these lectures set out in a shorter form. I hope it will be admitted by my critics that this experiment, whether successful or unsuccessful, was worth making, and that except in the University Extension system, it could not easily have been made. Bernard Bosanquet. London, January 1895.

펼쳐보기접어보기